The new world order of trade helps accomplish non-economic policy goals such as national security and technological dominance.

The new world order of trade helps accomplish non-economic policy goals such as national security and technological dominance.

To the extent that freer trade generally helps enrich the economic lives of citizens worldwide, many trade partners seek to reduce tariffs, quotas, embargoes, foreign investment restrictions, and other barriers to free trade. In light of recent tariffs and investment restrictions in the Sino-American trade war, the U.S. further decouples and derisks from China. The WTO continues to help resolve trade disputes as the Biden administration calls for fair and reciprocal bilateral trade engagements with China. For better national security and ESG woke capitalism, many western allies should further strengthen the global supply chains for AI, 5G, semiconductors, rare earths, pharmaceutical ingredients, and electric vehicles etc. Global trade partners must now work together to reduce carbon emissions worldwide in accordance with stringent ESG rules and regulations. With high hopes of woke capitalism, the new world order of trade arises from greater multilateral agreement and legitimacy.

After World War II of the late-1940s, many leaders converged on support for freer trade. These leaders held the basic belief that more open markets would promote growth, competition, and innovation etc to substantially enrich the economic lives of citizens worldwide. Indeed, these leaders pursued these main benefits of freer trade, first in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and then after the GATT transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the mid-1990s. China and Taiwan joined the WTO in 2001. Many western leaders hoped that this admission would lead to economic and political convergence with rich democracies. In the subsequent 30 years, Taiwan became a new open democracy in East Asia, whereas, China enshrined state capitalism in its mainstream industrial trade policy in support of domestic protectionism.

Between 1990 and 2022, the trade-weighted-average global tariff under WTO rules fell by almost 5 percentage points. This pervasive tariff reduction was greatest in poor countries: China’s tariffs fell by 28 percentage points; India’s tariffs fell by 51 percentage points; and Brazil’s tariffs fell by 10 percentage points. This world order of trade prompted a push for bilateral and regional trade pacts. These trade deals expanded from 50 in the early-1990s to more than 300 in 2022. These trade deals cut the trade-weighted tariff by another 3 percentage points.

This open world system supported an explosion of cross-border trade as a fraction of total output, from 30% in the early-1970s to more than 60% in 2020-2022. Over the same time frame, complex global supply chains grew from 37% to 50% of total trade worldwide. This global trade growth arose from both lower transport costs as well as a sharp reduction in economic policy uncertainty. Specifically, this reduction in economic policy uncertainty might be responsible for more than one-third of the recent growth in Chinese exports in the first 22 years of the new century.

In the new world order of trade, cross-country cost differences might turn out to be legitimate forms of comparative advantage. Many western leaders view economic integration as a new way for trade partners to achieve non-economic goals. Apart from free trade, these non-economic goals include national security, environmental protection, labor harmonization, elite-mass conflict resolution, and technological advancement. Not only would open markets benefit from free trade and economic integration, but these markets would also adopt-and-emulate higher standards for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices worldwide.

A recent World Bank study empirically shows that a 10% increase in participation in global value chains significantly correlates with an increase in income per capita of more than 10% in the long run ceteris paribus. In a positive light, freer trade has led to higher living standards worldwide. The U.S. International Trade Commission reckons the American bilateral and regional trade agreements have already raised real income and economic growth by at least 1.3 to 2 percentage points. Another survey further finds that poor countries with greater trade liberalization enjoy higher economic growth of 1.5 to 2 percentage points. The long-term benefits of free trade should outweigh its costs, and trade liberalization helps enrich the economic lives of citizens worldwide.

In November 2020, 15 Asia-Pacific countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade block that China currently leads for further trade liberalization. Post-Brexit Britain seeks to cover at least 80% of its trade with preferential treatments, although Britain has erected new barriers to free trade with the closest neighbor, the European Union. With respect to digital markets, America, Canada, and the European Union now discuss common global trade standards for online services such as AI, 5G, e-commerce, and cloud service provision etc.

However, there has not been a general round of WTO trade liberalization since the mid-1990s. This lack of progress reflects a widespread perception that the ideology of free trade has failed to deliver its promises. In the OECD club of rich countries, politicians have experienced furious backlashes against bilateral and regional free trade agreements. The common complaint is that trade liberalization creates both winners and losers. The winners are often powerful multinational corporations that lobby hard to welcome reductions in tariffs, quotas, embargoes, foreign investment restrictions, and other barriers to free trade. The losers are usually domestic sunset industries as freer trade leaves behind many domestic low-skill workers. Although the Biden administration no longer hands out random tariff threats, the U.S. keeps the 25% retaliatory tariffs on $370 billion worth of Chinese imports since the Trump administration.

Despite the post-war embrace of freer trade (due to both GATT and WTO), political support for further global trade liberalization seems to rest on fragile foundations. Our current analysis delves into how governments use the new world order of trade to achieve non-economic policy goals. These goals include national security, labor harmonization, technological advancement, environmental biodiversity protection, and elite-mass conflict resolution. Open markets can further benefit from free trade and economic integration. At the same time, these open markets may emulate the pervasive standards and best practices in ESG woke capitalism. In this new world order of trade, political power increasingly trumps multilateral rules and regulations over global development.

 

Both China and America can serve as responsible stakeholders in the global trade system.

Over the past few years, China has defied the spirit, if not the letter, of the WTO’s trade rules. Also, America has broken the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. In fact, America has brandished tariffs and foreign investment restrictions against China for better national security. As these global superpowers inevitably become adamant in economic conflict, both have flouted the underlying basic principle of the multilateral trade system: instead of political power, WTO rules should govern trade worldwide. In the global trade system, both China and America should serve as responsible stakeholders not only for freer trade arrangements, but also for non-economic concerns such as environmental degradation, labor-led social harmony, elite-mass conflict resolution, and technological advancement etc.

Under the Obama administration, China’s prosperity was thought to be good and ideal for America and the world. Since the Trump administration, however, China’s prosperity seemed to conflict with the medium-term goal of maintaining American military, technological, and economic supremacy. China and America might have fallen into a Thucydides trap. In response to this conflict, the Biden administration keeps Trump-era tariffs, launches fresh investment restrictions and import controls against China, and then blacklists many Chinese companies such as HuaWei, ZTE, and ByteDance as foreign entities that strategically threaten U.S. national security. These U.S. defensive trade remedies may work well in constraining the recent rise of China. Nonetheless, these remedies cannot accord with both the spirit and letter of WTO rules and regulations over freer trade.

In the meantime, there is little appetite for America to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This substantive trade pact includes provisions on state enterprises and anti-competitive business practices in China. Recent trilateral trade talks among America, Europe, and Japan focus on rewriting fresh rules against state subsidies on Chinese low-cost imports. These efforts make the trade relations between China and America extraordinarily murky. As trade relations sour, the fine distinction between economic and national security concerns grows blurrier. The conception of risk over China has somewhat broadened from narrow concerns over military rivalry to include U.S. technological leadership.

The Chinese government rejects the common complaint that China cannot serve as a responsible stakeholder in the multilateral global trade system. In recent years, the Xi administration approved China’s official participation in the RCEP and EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Also, the Xi administration asked to join the CPTPP with virtually no American interference. Extant members of the CPTPP are well aware of China’s current divergence from WTO rules and regulations. Meanwhile, China continues to beef up unilateral domestic defenses. These defenses include new laws for the Chinese government to impose penalties on several multinational corporations that comply with foreign economic sanctions (especially from America and its western allies).

America should probably overhaul the WTO’s trade dispute settlement mechanism. Each month, more than 100 WTO members make fair trade appeals to America to restore appointments to the appellate body. Outside the WTO, big countries such as China and America simply dominate and often destroy opportunities for others. More than 25 WTO members from China to the European Union have tried setting up their own fair trade appeal system. However, big trade partners such as Britain, Japan, India, South Korea, and Taiwan etc have chosen not to join any alternative appeal system other than the WTO. In this new world order of trade without secure dispute settlement, the risk of trade impasses exacerbates geopolitical tensions. The hidden danger is that bilateral trade disputes may descend into politically toxic accusations of both trade coercion and intimidation via tariff threats and the likes. The WTO may be imperfect, but as a mutually beneficial set of fair trade rules, the WTO has more legitimacy than an alternative global trade system where the super-powers carve up trade as they see fit.

 

In the hot pursuit of technological advancement, governments should help ensure resilient critical global supply chains for AI, 5G, semiconductors, electric vehicles, rare earths, and active pharmaceutical ingredients.

Amid the global pandemic corona virus crisis of 2020-2022, many countries faced serious shortages of masks, vaccines, ventilators, and other protective remedies. During those years, many countries further experienced supply chain bottlenecks for semiconductors, graphical processing units (GPU), 5G telecom networks, and lithium batteries etc. For better national security, the Biden administration seeks to shorten the global supply chains for AI, 5G, semiconductors, electric vehicles, rare earths, and active pharmaceutical ingredients. For America and its western allies, the modern industrial policy requires bringing high-tech plants, machines, factories, and other capital-intensive modern production facilities back on U.S. soil. American consumers can benefit from this onshore reorganization of global supply chains.

In the pandemic years, the fear was that foreign suppliers might protect national interests at the expense of trade flows. As British and American cash for vaccine-makers came on condition that production would go first to their populations, other countries like Australia, Canada, and South Korea that wanted to secure supplies invested in the final stage of production. In a severe crisis, foreign suppliers would be unreliable.

In Washington, the new industrial policy with more state intervention reverberates through the White House, Congress, think-tanks, and special interest groups. The Biden administration has issued a new executive order for all relevant government agencies to review the global supply chains for semiconductors, microchips, AIoT-led large language models (LLM), and 5G telecom networks. In due course, these global supply chains should become more resilient in response to post-pandemic aftershocks. Further, the Biden administration includes lots of business incentives in the signature $2 trillion Build Back Better bill for more government expenditures on climate change, health care, inflation, inequality, and other social and economic problems in America. Since Joe Biden won his presidential bid, the U.S. microchip provision has grown into $52 billion as part of the $250 billion American Innovation and Competition Act. This tech legislation includes $80 billion for modern research on artificial intelligence (AI), robotic automation, and biotechnology, $23 billion on space navigation, and $10 billion for tech hubs outside Silicon Valley.

Western leaders justify this new industrial policy in 2 fundamental ways. First, the new tech legislation helps preserve the rightful place for America, Britain, Canada, and Europe in the global pecking order. Second, this tech legislation reinvigorates domestic economic development with new high-tech clusters. On national defense grounds, a dose of self-reliance may make sense. Powerful semiconductor chips are critical to military arms and missiles. This consideration has become important since the Russian surprise invasion of Ukraine in early-2022. In fact, Taiwan Semi-conductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) produces the world’s cutting-edge microchips in the major science parks in the northern parts of Taiwan. Taiwan has been an American ally since World War II; and since the Nationalist Party lost the Chinese Civil War and then retreated to Taiwan in 1949, today China continues to claim that Taiwan is part of the mother mainland (under the One-China policy). The former fact troubles Beijing, and the latter claim worries Washington. Adversaries understandably covet at least some independent microchip production capacity. In the Taiwan Strait, both sides should not undertake unilateral actions to change the status quo (in support of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region). In recent decades, strategic engagement has long served as an important complement to creative ambiguity in the peaceful resolution of long prevalent geopolitical tensions between China and Taiwan. Since the Trump administration launched 25% tariffs in the trade war against China, this trade conflict has already exacerbated broader anti-China investor sentiments under the Biden administration.

For Western governments, the modern industrial policy features AI, biotech, clean energy, quantum cloud service provision, and semiconductor microchip production. In the short run, extra demand risks bidding up the cost of inputs. In the longer run, extra demand may mean a supply glut. The industrial-policy arms race may turbo-charge boom-bust cycles for the capital-intensive industries from semiconductors and microchips to 5G telecom networks and AIoT hubs. Recent proponents of the venture-capitalist state are not fans of wasteful pork-barrel fiscal expenditures. In practice, these proponents would like governments to support genuinely full-blown commercial ideas with crystal-clear performance yardsticks. The venture-capitalist state should be as ruthless as Silicon Valley at pulling the plug on failures. In this fresh light, the state need not pick winners, but the state has to let losers go.

If many governments successfully foster critical high-tech industries, their alliances can go from nice to necessary. When global supply shoots up, prices plummet and then everyone tries to export the same products as trade tensions quickly increase. This cycle is a key lesson learned from the strenuous battle between America and Europe over aircraft subsidies, as well as the recent trade war between China and America. Reshoring global supply chains hence helps lessen the risk of shortages in trade.

 

Fair and reciprocal trade agreements can help ensure the better protection of basic human rights through stringent labor standards and regulations.

In lieu of the prior North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the new US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) includes a rapid response mechanism. This mechanism would lead to the U.S. imposition of 25% tariffs on Mexican exports if Mexico cannot strictly enforce higher labor standards and regulations. This threat effectively helps deliver prompt and meaningful results for offshore foreign workers who would contribute to the production of imports to America. This business case is part of a baseline shift to the use of trade policy as an instrument to deter human-rights abuses.

Specifically, the free trade deal promotes higher labor standards and regulations outside America. For instance, foreign workers have the freedom of association to become part of a labor union. In turn, this labor union helps better negotiate wages, bonuses, fair employment practices, or working conditions etc. Foreign employers should not interfere with these labor-union rights and decisions. Also, higher labor standards should ensure the abolition of child labor, as well as any form of modern slavery, debt bondage, or low-skill labor exploitation. Foreign employers must not discriminate workers on the basis of their race, age, gender, religion, national origin, or any other demographic characteristic. All workers should have equal access to employment opportunities and fair treatments in the workplace. Foreign employers should provide their workers with a safe and healthy workplace in accordance with standard rules and regulations set forth in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). Foreign employers must provide adequate protective equipment, on-the-job education, and access to medical care in case of accidents or illnesses.

In this positive light, the U.S. government uses new trade deals as a unique lever of business control to help ensure higher labor standards and regulations outside America. This new thread permeates the regional and bilateral free trade pacts for America, Britain, Canada, and Europe in at least 3 major ways: fair and reciprocal trade deals such as the USMCA and RCEP, the special access to the OECD club of rich countries for poor countries, and unilateral bans on foreign investments and export controls. Over the past couple of decades, fair reciprocal trade agreements have increasingly included labor provisions on collective bargaining rights through labor unions, child labor, labor exploitation, and employment discrimination. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) regards strict enforcement of the USMCA and subsequent trade pacts as a core part of the new worker-centric trade policy under the Biden administration. Already with real results, the rapid response mechanism defends higher labor standards and basic human rights for workers at a big Mexican car-parts maker. In recent years, the 15 largest Mexican companies have pledged a long-term commitment to neutrality in future labor-union elections. These baby steps provide incentives for offshore trade partners to adhere to higher U.S. labor rules and regulations.

In addition to U.S. trade pacts with Canada and Mexico, the European Union now imposes sanctions over human rights through non-reciprocal trade deals with poor countries. The E.U. strengthens its free-trade system of preferences, which makes tariff cuts for developing countries conditional on a swathe of better labor standards and human rights. The E.U. further implements a more proactive approach to strict enforcement of higher labor standards in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Regional trade relations ease with tariff cuts when these countries demonstrate to the European Union’s satisfaction that their workers are free from labor exploitation, discrimination, or any other form of work mistreatment. Around the world, this world trend helps ensure better low-skill labor harmonization through bilateral and regional trade deals.

Following the recent footsteps of Britain, Germany, and Spain, the European Union now works on due diligence legislation to obligate trade companies to check that their foreign suppliers refrain from engaging in human-rights abuses and violations. In America, the Customers and Border Protection authorities have started to quiz importers about their global supply chains (in support of human-rights protection). In recent times, G7 trade ministers discuss and explore many ways to help smaller trade companies tell whether foreign suppliers operate in problematic places.

Around the world, governments coordinate in a bid to inform trade corporations of poor human-rights records in China. G7 leaders have already stated their common concern over child labor and other labor exploitation in global supply chains in the agricultural, solar, and garment sectors, in specific parts of China such as Xinjiang and Tibet. The U.S. State, Treasury, and Commerce departments formally advise trade companies to withdraw their investments there. Australian, French, German, and Japanese governments further warn their trade businesses to be careful about supply chains through these parts of China. In combination, these fair trade tactics and strategies help promote better labor standards and human rights around the world. This trend has become part of the new world order of trade.

 

The new world order of trade can contribute to feasible state solutions in response to climate change, green energy, and environmental degradation.

A recent Pew Research survey suggests that more than 60% of Americans believe environmental protection should be a top priority for Congress and the President. Another recent survey shows that 35% of Europeans believe climate change is the world’s most severe problem (ahead of poverty, hunger, and lack of drinking water). Global ambition and coordination now manifest in the Paris agreement on climate change and further in the U.N. sustainable development goals.

Recent IMF evidence indicates that governments spend the equivalent of less than 0.5% of total GDP per annum on fossil-fuel subsidies. Meanwhile, the current tariffs on products made by higher-carbon polluters are too low to be consistent with the net-zero targets by 2050. Specifically, more carbon-intensive products incur lower taxes. The difference between more and less carbon-intensive products equates an implicit state subsidy of $85 to $120 per ton.

There has been growing acceptance of the close linkages between trade and the environment. Higher carbon costs account for more than half of the recent rise in American trade flows to Canada, Mexico, and other trade partners in the past 50+ years. Since the early-1990s, new Canadian air-quality standards have cut export revenues by about 25%. However, it is less clear whether trade liberalization tends to prompt polluters to relocate to countries with laxer environmental standards. In fact, many other factors come into play as well. In theory, the WTO should be the ideal forum for environmental biodiversity conflict resolution.

In recent quarters, APEC trade ministers have already launched a new process for identifying environmental services to inform future trade talks. Many rich countries try to reach an agreement on climate change, trade, and sustainable development. In effect, this agreement reduces fossil-fuel subsidies and then removes tariffs on environmental goods with ecologically-friendly guidelines. At the forefront, the E.U. has operated an emissions trading system (ETS) for many years. This ETS makes companies buy permits if they want to emit carbon dioxide and most other kinds of greenhouse gas. Also, the E.U. ETS protects some more carbon-intensive sectors from foreign competition. Meanwhile, the E.U. plans to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism that would gradually extend the ETS to importers. Higher carbon prices would translate into lower charges under the current system. In this fresh light, the E.U. ETS encourages foreign governments to introduce equivalent carbon prices. During this green transition, America, Britain, and Canada consider similar pathways with carbon prices to accomplish net-zero targets by 2050.

Western governments may fail to address climate change tech risks in due course. Despite more than 30 years of global climate change advocacy and diplomacy, the international system has struggled to make progress on climate risk management. Today, atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have all reached record highs. Emission trajectories make it unlikely that all countries help limit the increase in average world temperature to no more than 2 degrees Celsius. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicates that there is a 50% fair chance for all countries to reach this climate target by 2030. Current commitments made by the G7 private sector suggest an increase of 2.7-3.5 degrees Celsius by mid-century in accordance with the recent Paris agreement on climate change.

Recent extreme weather events and other climate-driven rare disasters expose a divergence between what is politically feasible and what is scientifically necessary. Despite some long-term climate change policies on the green tech transition (such as the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and Eurozone RE-Power-EU plan), the recent overall momentum on climate risk management remains unlikely to accelerate in the next 2-5 years. Policy-makers confront the economic trade-offs among energy security, affordability, and sustainability. In many rich countries, public companies must mandatorily disclose carbon emissions. These mandatory disclosures accord with the net-zero climate targets of the recent Paris agreement.

In the first 2 decades of this century, average world temperature has already risen by at least 1 degree Celsius. In several parts of the world, people can feel the fresh compounding effect of this sharp increase in average world temperature. This main climate change magnifies several humanitarian challenges such as food shortages, livestock deaths, extreme weather events, and other rare disasters. As floods, heat waves, droughts, and other extreme weather events etc become more severe and more frequent, a wider set of populations may bear the social and economic costs of these rare events. In parallel, the recent consolidation of both public-sector and private-sector resources may set up trade-offs between rare disaster recovery and climate change adaptation. The new diversion of resources toward climate change adaptation may further slow joint progress on global-warming targets in those core countries (e.g. China, India, and Indonesia) that remain the biggest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions worldwide.

Even if both the public and private sectors receive more fiscal stimulus for climate change adaptation, governments may risk not safeguarding against future extreme weather events and rare disasters as these governments scramble to provide relief and support in disaster-hit regions. In light of private market mechanisms for rapid disaster recovery, there is an unknown risk of retreat by insurers from some areas of natural catastrophe coverage. The likely shortfall in insurance has already grown from $117 billion in 2020 to about $165 billion in 2023. Specifically, world insurance actuarially covers only 7% of economic losses due to extreme weather events and other rare disasters over the past 20 years. This common shortfall exposes many countries and regions to extreme weather events and climate-driven disasters. In light of this common shortfall, future free-trade pacts should include provisions on better climate risk management and environmental biodiversity protection.

 

What is the biggest threat to the new world order of trade? Numerous supply-chain managers may fixate on logistical bottlenecks and shortages for semiconductors, microchips, graphical processing units (GPU), 5G telecom networks, rare earths, and pharmaceutical ingredients etc. As a result of these new logistical bottlenecks and shortages, the transfer costs surge amid the recent rampant pandemic crisis. However, the new world order of trade now seems to diverge from the foundational rules and regulations of the WTO with multilateral strategic engagements. Indeed, this global divergence reflects the common tendency of western governments to achieve non-economic goals such as national security, environmental protection, climate change, labor-led harmonization, and technological advancement etc. The WTO, IMF, and World Bank should serve as independent arbiters of stringent ESG rules and regulations to help deliver better legitimacy and stability in this new world order of trade.

 

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